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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
EUGENE PUETT*
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
II. COUNTIES
III. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS

IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL-LEGISLATION
I. MUNIcnIAL CORPORATIONS

1. Change of Boundaries.-Incorporated cities and towns continued
to use the authority in the annexation statute to annex by ordinance,'
and the courts were presented with several questions of interpretation
of the statute not heretofore answered.
2. Discretion To Annex by Ordinance.-The question in Central
Soya Co. v. City of Chattanooga2 was whether or not a municipality
when petitioned by "interested persons" must propose extension of its
corporate limits by the referendum method. 3
The complainants filed a petition with the city of Chattanooga to
have a certain area annexed by referendum one day before the commencement of proceedings by the city to annex a portion of the same
territory by ordinance, and insisted that the city had no power to
proceed by ordinance in view of the petition.
The court found nothing in the terms of the statute or the conditions which resulted in its enactment that would prevent it from
holding that the discretion to annex by ordinance or to propose
annexation by referendum was vested in the governing body of the
city.
3. Burden of Proof in Annexation.-Since the action of the municipality is by ordinance,4 the suit to contest the validity of an annexation ordinance is in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding.5 In State
ex rel. Senff v. City of Columbia6 the relators, citing cases involving
title to office, 7 contended that the burden of proof was on the city
to show that the ordinance was reasonable.
*Consultant, Municipal Law, Municipal Technical Advisory Service.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (1956).
2. 338 S.W.2d 576 (Tenn. 1960).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-311, -312 (1956).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (1956).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-310 (1956).

6. 343 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1961).
7. State ex rel. Dobbins v. Larry' 332 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1960); State ex
rel. General v. Allen, 57 S.W. 182 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900).
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Although the question had not been previously decided, the court
in Morton v. Johnson City8 applied the same principles in determining
the validity of an annexation ordinance as are applied to acts of the
legislature, saying that one attacking the act must show that it is
essentially arbitrary and does not rest upon any reasonable basis.9
In the principal case it was held that the presumption of validity of
the ordinance placed on those attacking it the burden of showing it
unreasonable.
Under an almost identical annexation statute of the State of
Mississippi it was held that those who contest the right to extend
ought to have the burden of proving that the ordinance is unreasonable.10
There seems to be no general agreement on burden of proof in quo
warranto cases." Whatever the rule may be, the court chose to ignore
the quo warranto nature of the suit as far as the question of burden
of proof was concerned and treated the presumption in favor of the
ordinance as controlling. This is consistent with the view taken in
State ex rel. Southerland v. Town of Greeneville12 where the court
held that it was the intention of the legislature to integrate with the
annexation statute such sections of the quo warranto statute as
would be applicable.
4. Notice in Annexation.-Another point decided in the Columbia
case 13 was the time within which the municipality must pass the
annexation ordinance after notice and public hearing. The city of
Columbia waited nine months before passing the ordinance. The
contestants contended that this was not sufficient notice. The court
held otherwise and pointed out that the statute did not provide any
limitation as long as notice was given at least seven days before the
proposal or passage of the ordinance. The court referred to the
Johnson City case 14 as holding that the requirement of notice and
public hearing should be liberally construed.
5. Reasonableness of Annexation Ordinance.-On December 7, 1960,
the supreme court in two cases, State ex rel. Campbell v. Mayor and
Aldermen 5 and City of Knoxville v. State ex rel. Graves,16 held that
the question of reasonableness of an annexation ordinance cannot be
decided on demurrer. In the Knoxville case the court, agreeing with
8. 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1960).
9. Id. at 927.
10. Town of Crystal Springs v. Moreton, 131 Miss. 77, 95 So. 242 (1923).
11. 44 Am. JuR. Quo Warranto § 106 (1942).
12. 201 Tenn. 133, 297 S.W.2d 68 (1956).
13. State ex rel. Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1961).
14. Morton v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1960).
15. 341 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn. 1960).
16. 341 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1960).
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the trial judge that he would have to hear proof as to the factual
matters to determine whether the question of reasonableness of the
ordinance was debatable, said: "Obviously, these factual matters
could not be determined on demurrer .... ,117 The Campbell case
stated that the court should hear the evidence that may be presented,
and if the court concludes that a fairly debatable question is
presented, then it becomes the duty of the trial court to find that the
ordinance is reasonable and valid. 18 The rule announced in the
Johnson City case 19 contemplates that those wishing to challenge the
reasonableness of an annexation ordinance should at least be given
the opportunity to prove their case by such evidence as they might
have available.
Where the unreasonableness of an ordinance enacted under a
general power is not apparent on its face, evidence extrinsic to it
may be introduced to establish its unreasonableness. 0 If the unreasonableness of an annexation ordinance is not apparent on its
face, it seems that the contestants should be allowed to introduce
extrinsic evidence, if the right to question its validity is to have any
meaning. It would be rather anomalous to deny to those having the
burden of proof2 ' an opportunity to prove unreasonableness in the
22
only way available.
6. Representation of Annexed Area and Referral to Planning
Commission.-Two minor points were also disposed of in the Knoxville case23 with little difficulty. The first was that the annexation
ordinance does not have to contain, as a condition precedent to its
validity, a provision for representation of residents of the annexed
area. The court said there was nothing in the statute to warrant such
construction. The second point was that there is no requirement that
the matter be referred to the planning commission before passage of
the ordinance.
7. Annexation Legislation.-The authority

of municipalities

to

17. Id. at 721.
18. State ex rel. Campbell v. Mayor and Aldermen, 341 S.W.2d at 735.
19. Morton v. Johnson City, 333 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1960).
20. The correct rule appears to be that the admissibility of such evidence
depends upon whether the ordinance has been enacted (1) under a valid,
express and specific power, in which case extrinsic evidence is not admissible;
or (2) under general, implied or incidental power, in which event extrinsic
evidence is admissible to show its unreasonableness. 5 McQUIuaM, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 18.24 (3d ed. 1950).
21. See State ex rel.Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1961),
for a holding that the burden of proof is on those attacking the ordinance.
22. In a later case not included in the period of this survey an annexation
ordinance of the city of Nashville was upheld on demurrer by judicial
notice. State ex rel. Schmittou v. City -of Nashville, 345 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn.
1961).
23. City of Knoxville v. State ex rel. Graves, 341 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1960).

1338

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 14

annex by ordinance 24 was amended by two acts of the 1961 General
Assembly. The first2 amended the law so as to require that the
annexing municipality prove that the annexation of 'territory which
is the site of substantial industrial plant development is not
unreasonable. 6 It also specifically makes the need of municipal
services by the plants, and the ability and intent of the municipality
to extend the services factors in determining reasonableness. The
other 27 requires that before any territory more than one-fourth square
mile in area or having a population of more than five hundred persons may be annexed the governing body of the municipality shall
adopt a plan of service. This plan must set forth at a minimum the
identification and projected timing of municipal services proposed to
be extended into the territory to be annexed. If there is a local
planning commission, the plan of service must be submitted to it for
study and written report.
8. Control Over Streets.-The city of Paris granted the Paris-Henry
County Public Utility District a franchise to lay pipes under the
surface of the city streets to furnish gas to the inhabitants of the
city.
A city ordinance required a permit to make excavation in the
streets, charged a fee, required a deposit to insure repair and restoration, and also required that liability insurance be carried.
The utility district made excavation without compliance with the
ordinance, and was convicted in city court. On appeal the circuit
court held the ordinance unconstitutional as impairing the obligation
of contract; the supreme court reversed, holding the ordinance a
reasonable and valid police regulation.2 Although the franchise gave
the utility district the right to make use of the streets in installing
its pipes, such right was subject to regulation by the city in its
governmental capacity under the police power, and this power could
not be limited by contract.
The rule that the police power cannot be limited by contract may
be stated in another way. The authority of the state itself or its
constituted agencies to exercise the police power is implied in every
contract, and this rule is constantly applied to contracts made with
the state or any of its agencies.2 9 Thus the power of the city to
24. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-309, -310 (1956).
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-310 (Supp. 1961).

26. In other annexations the burden of proof is on the party attacking the
annexation ordinance. State ex rel. Senff v. City of Columbia, 343 S.W.2d
888 (Tenn. 1960).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-309 (Supp. 1961).

28. City of Paris v. Paris-Henry County Utility District, 340 S.W.2d 885
(Tenn. 1960).
29. 5 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 19.37 (3d ed. 1950).
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make reasonable regulations governing street excavations would be
implied in the franchise with the utility district.
Other examples of the police power with respect to franchises of
public service companies are the powers exercised in proper cases
to require the relocation of facilities in streets and to require that
wires be placed underground. 30
9. Closing of Streets.-In Wilkey v. Cincinnati, N.O. & Tex. Pac.
Ry., 3 the question concerned the authority of a city to contract with
respect to control over its streets; the jurisdiction of the state department of highways over streets of a municipality was incidentally
involved.
Acting under a contract with the Railway Company, the federal
government, and the city of Dayton, the state highway department
had re-routed a highway from one city street to another about four
blocks away. On the street where the highway had been previously
routed, the department, in order to eliminate a railroad grade crossing,
had erected barriers across the street at the crossing. Property
owners who had been using the street filed a bill for an injunction
against the railroad and the city to have the barriers removed and
the street kept open. The court of appeals, in affirming the decree
of the lower court granting an injunction, held that (1) when the
highway was changed, jurisdiction over the old route reverted to the
local authority; (2) Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-53132
does not apply to roads and streets no longer a part of the state
highway system; and (3) the power of cities to contract in furtherance of public works projects under Tennessee Code Annotated
section 6-160333 does not authorize a contractor to close a public
street four blocks away from the project. The court said that contracts of a municipality which tend to embarrass or control its
legislative powers and duties or to cede the rights of citizens are
30. State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. 1958);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Nashville, 35 Tenn. App. 207, 243
S.W.2d 617 (M.S. 1951); 7 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoATONS § 24.588 (3d
ed. 1950).
31. 340 S.W.2d 256 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
32. This section requires the department of highways to "construct, reconstruct, improve and maintain streets in municipalities over which traffic

from state highways is routed . . ." TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-531 (1956).
33. "Every municipality shall have power and is authorized . . . to make

contracts and execute instruments containing such terms, provisions, and
conditions as in the discretion of the governing body of the municipality may
be necessary, proper, or advisable for the purpose of obtaining a grant, loan,
or other financial assistance from any federal agency pursuant to or by
virtue of any act for post war projected aid; to make all other contracts
and execute all other instruments necessary, proper, or advisable in or-for
the furtherance of any public works projects; and to carry out and perform
the terms and conditions of all such contracts or instruments." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 6-1603(h) (1956).
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not looked upon with favor.34 The right to make such a contract
should not be based upon implication from a strained and unnatural
construction of a statute dealing in general terms with the unrelated
subject of federal aid projects.
Since the city had not passed an ordinance closing the street, the
35
barriers constituted an obstruction.
The fundamental principle that public powers conferred upon a
municipal corporation cannot be surrendered or relinquished to others
in the absence of legislative authority has been applied frequently to
the control of streets.36 Legislative power cannot be delegated by a
municipality unless expressly authorized by statute.3 7 The construction put upon the authority of the city to contract seems to be in
accord with these principles.
10. Waiver of Immunity.-An action was brought under the Tennessee Wrongful Death Statute38 against the town of Morristown as a
result of a collision of a police car with a car driven by the deceased.
The issues submitted to the jury were whether or not the town
knowingly (1) allowed its cruiser on which liability insurance was
carried to be operated by an inexperienced, young, reckless, childish
and immature driver; and (2) selected as one of its police officers, a
young, inexperienced, reckless, childish and immature person. The
assignment of this as error was sustained in Mayor and Aldermen
39
v. Inman.
The choosing of agents for the enforcement of public laws is a
governmental function, and a municipality cannot be held liable for
negligence about such matters.40 It has been held that the carrying
of insurance on police cruisers is not the equivalent of a consent to
be sued for the exercise of any other governmental function, such
as the choosing of police officers. This is necessarily so because the
waiver is only to the extent of the insurance. 41 If the contract of
insurance covers only the police car, the insuror could not be held
liable outside the coverage of the contract.
34. Cf. Carter County v. City of Elizabethton, 39 Tenn. App. 685, 287

S.W.2d 934 (E.S. 1955).
35. The charter of the city of Dayton grants it power to vacate streets by
ordinance. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1901(15) (1956).

36. Nashville v. Singer & Johnson Fertilizer Co., 127 Tenn. 107, 153 S.W.

838 (1912); Knoxville v. Harth, 105 Tenn. 436, 58 S.W. 650 (1900); 13 McQumLLm, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 37.17 (3d ed. 1950).
37. 2 McQumIaN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.40 (3d ed. 1950).
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-607 (1956).
39. 342 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).

40. Combs v. City of Elizabethton, 161 Tenn. 363, 31 S.W.2d 691 (1930).

41. McCloud v. City of LaFollette, 38 Tenn. App. 553, 276 S.W.2d 763 (E.S.

1954).
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11. Emergency Vehicles.-It was also held in the Morristown case2
that in order for an emergency vehicle to be exempt from the rules
governing other vehicles, the driver thereof must make use of
audible and visual signals as required by statute,43 the flashing of a
searchlight alone being insufficient to invoke the exemption. A police
officer who fails to comply with the requirements of the statute
subjects himself to all rules of the road and common-law duties to
which an ordinary motorist is subject.
12. Zoning.-In State ex rel. Morris v. City of Nashville44 a property
owner had been denied a permit to place trailers on a lot because to
do so would, in the opinion of the building inspector, violate certain
zoning and building regulations which referred to buildings and
structures but did not specify trailers. The board of zoning appeals
affirmed, but certiorari was not taken. Instead the property owner
brought mandamus to compel the officials to issue the permit. The
chancellor granted the writ and the supreme court reversed. The
supreme court cited several cases from other jurisdictions and stated
that they conflicted hopelessly on the question of whether a trailer
is a building or a dwelling in respect to a zoning ordinance. The
court concluded that the city officials did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously in their denial of the permit; therefore
the court would not disturb their decision by mandamus. The courts
will not utilize mandamus to disturb decisions and actions of boards
and officers having discretionary powers, except where they (1)
act in an arbitrary and oppressive manner, or (2) act beyond their
jurisdiction, or (3) refuse to assume the jurisdiction which the law
45
imposes upon them.
Mandamus generally is precluded when certiorari or statutory
appeal is available for review of the action of a zoning board or
official. 46 In the absence of facts showing an abuse of discretion or
other legal error to the prejudice of the rights of the relator, a writ
of mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit or other administrative action in zoning will be denied.47 The exception-abuse of
discretion-has been recognized by other courts. In Finston,v. Town
of Nutley 48 the court said: "If the record before us showed clearly
that prosecutors were entitled to the permit, we might well grant the
42. Mayor and Aldermen v. Inman, 342 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1960).
43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-808 (1956).

44. 343 S.W.2d 847 (Tenn. 1961).
45. State ex rel. Millsaps v. Board of Education, 122 Tenn. 161, 121 S.W.
499 (1909).
46. 8 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.307 (3d ed. 1950).
47. Ibid.
48. 1 N.J. Super. 85, 62 A.2d 483 (App. Div. 1948).
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mandamus, even though the appeal to the Board of Adjustment had
not been pursued ....

But the record is too scanty, the prosecutors'

uncertain." 49

right too
In Janigianv. City of Dearborn50 it was held
that a board of zoning appeals did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to issue a building permit in view of the fact that some evidence
that granting such permit would be inimical to public health and safety
was shown. The persons seeking the writ of mandamus failed to show
that they had a clear legal right to the issuance of such a permit by
the board.
13. Legislation.-In addition to the above mentioned public acts of
the 1961 General Assembly relating to or affecting municipalities,
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-1251 to -1268 seem significant.
They authorize municipalities to levy special assessments for sanitary
sewers, streets, sidewalks and storm drains. The cost of such facilities
shall be shared by the property owners who benefit thereby in
proportion to the assessed valuation of their land, not including improvements. The municipality, however, must bear at least twentyfive per cent of the cost unless it pledges its full faith and credit to
satisfy any deficiency in the collection of improvement assessments.
Improvement assessments shall not be levied against undeveloped
or largely undeveloped areas, but shall be limited to areas in which
a majority of the lots or parcels of land have buildings or other
structures on them.
II. COUNTIES
1. Change of Voting Places.-Byrd v. Rhea County 1 dealt with the
authority of county courts to change voting divisions or places, and
was largely a case of statutory construction. 2 As far as future
changes in voting places or divisions are concerned, the case is of
academic interest only, since the 1961 General Assembly deleted all
the sections of the code in question5 3 and inserted new provisions.54
Under the new enactment, precinct boundaries may be established,
altered or modified by the commissioners of elections subject to
approval by the county court. Any change must be made at least
three months before an election in order to be effective for that
49. Id. at 484-85.
50. 336 Mich. 261, 57 N.W.2d 876 (1953).
51. 338 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1960).
52. The county court changed voting places without complying with the
conditions in TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-704 (1956), and insisted that § 2-704 did
not apply for various reasons. The supreme court held that when the conditions in § 2-704 existed, the county court was required to comply with them.
53. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-703 to -704 (1956).
54. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-701 to -702 (Supp. 1961).
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election. Changes made in the boundaries of precincts must be
55
recorded and published.
2. Appointment of Election Commissioners.-Buford v. State Board
of Elections56 held that private citizens who claimed no special interest or special injury could not maintain an action to have the
appointment of county election commissioners declared null and void;
nor could they question the qualifications of members of the county
election commission, this being a political question resting entirely
with the state board of elections. 57
3. Fees of Clerks.-The clerk of the circuit and criminal courts of
Clay County, who also served ex officio as clerk of the general sessions court, filed a declaratory judgment suit asking for the construction of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 8-2401 to -2413. 58 It
was his contention that the county was liable for the difference in the
amount of fees he received as clerk of the circuit and criminal courts
and the minimum salary provided by statute, and that the fees received for serving as clerk of the general sessions court should not
be counted in arriving at that minimum. The supreme court held
that he must account for all his fees, including fees earned as clerk
of the general sessions court, in arriving at his minimum salary.
The court said that the purpose of the Anti-Fee Act 59 was to make
these officers' salaries uniform, and that to allow clerks compensation
over and above the fees that they would otherwise earn would make
compensation uneven in the various counties in the same class. The
effect of such a holding would be to suspend a general statute for
the benefit of an individual. The court's decision is analogous to its
previous holdings that private acts which provide compensation
over and above the maximum salary to which officers are entitled
under the Anti-Fee Act 60 are unconstitutional. For example, in Board
of Education v. Shelby County5 ' the court found it necessary to hold
invalid a provision of the general law by which the legislature had
attempted to reserve a right to provide additional compensation by
private act.62
55. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-701 to -702 (Supp. 1961).
56. 334 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1960).
57. Jared v. Fitzgerald, 183 Tenn. 682, 195 S.W.2d 1 (1946).

58. Clay County v. Stone, 343 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. 1961).
59. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 8-2401 to -2413 (1956).
60. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-2401 to -2413 (1956).
61. 339 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1960).
62. "Provided, that the provisions of this section prohibiting additional
salaries or compensation to clerks of special courts shall not apply to court
of general session. Provided, further, that when such clerks shall serve as clerks
of a court of general session, it shall be lawful for such clerks to receive
additional compensation, and payable, as may be provided in the law creating
such general sessions court." TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-2411 (1956).
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4. Paupers.-InJennings v. Davidson County63 a county was held to

be entitled to recover the value of services rendered to a pauper
patient from an inheritance received by the pauper after the services
were rendered. The basis of the holding was that the patient at all
times owed for the services, that the services were gratuitous only if
the patient had no money.
It was also held that the statute of limitations did not apply, since
the county in providing for the poor was exercising a governmental
function.
5. Legislation.--Tennessee Code Annotated sections 5-1601 to -1612
authorize counties to establish, construct, acquire and operate certain
urban type public facilities in unincorporated areas, and to levy
appropriate charges or fees.
III. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DisTRICTS
1. Conflict of Interest.-A quo warranto proceeding was brought
against the defendant, a member of a county board of education;
he was charged with violating Tennessee Code Annotated sections
12-401 and 12-402. These sections prohibit any person whose duty it is
to vote on state, county or municipal contracts from having a personal interest in such contracts. The defendant, as agent for one or
more insurance companies, had written fire and indemnity insurance
policies on public schools in the county. He had received and continued to receive commissions based on a percentage of premiums.
By demurrer he contended that the statute was not violated because
the rates charged for insurance were governed by statute. In sustaining the lower court's overruling of the demurrer, the supreme
court held that the statute was violated because the board of education was vested with discretion as to whether to carry its own
insurance, or if it procured insurance, the amount it procured. Thus,
the amount of the commission which the defendant would receive
depended upon the exercise of discretion by the board. 64
The defendant's demurrer indicates that he was relying on the
case of State v. Yoakum,

65

which held that a loan of money in good

faith for a legitimate purpose at the legal rate of interest did not
violate the policy and purpose of the statute. This case, however, was
neither mentioned nor distinguished in the principal case.
2. Permanent Tenure.-In State ex rel. Stewart v. Lunsford66 the
63. 344 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1961).

64. State ex rel. Abernathy v. Anthony, 335 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. 1960).

65. 43 Tenn. App. 123, 306 S.W.2d 39 (E.S. 1957).
66. 336 S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1960).
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question was whether a former county superintendent of schools who
had served a four-year elective term in such capacity had qualified
by reason of such service for permanent tenure status under the
Teachers Tenure Act.67 He had, after such service, made application
for a teaching position but was not elected by the board of education.

The court was of the opinion that a superintendent is a teacher as
defined by the act and that the four-year elective term should be

counted as the probationary period required by the act; however, he
failed to meet one requirement-re-election or retention in the system

after the probationary period.
68
3. School Budgets.-State ex rel. Bobo v. County of Moore illustrates the difficulties which can sometimes arise when there is a division of responsibilities among public officers or bodies with respect
to a public function.
A supervisor and attendance teacher had been elected by the county
board of education and the board had adopted a resolution to amend
the school budget to provide for his salary and traveling expenses.
The superintendent of schools did not, however, present a budget to
the quarterly county court, and the court did not amend the budget to
provide for the teacher's salary and traveling expenses. The teacher
in a prior suit had obtained a decree holding that he held the position
under permanent tenure and was entitled to all rights, benefits and
salaries of the position. The action in the principal case was necessary
to enforce the decree and instruct the superintendent, board and
county court on their duties.
The inaction of the board of education was due to doubts that the
teacher had a contract, since the contract was not in writing; he had
been elected by the board without the recommendation of the superintendent, and the superintendent had not prepared the budget.
The court, citing Morton v. Hancock County, said that it was no
longer the law in Tennessee that a teacher's contract must be in
writing. 69 Also cited were cases refuting the idea that the board
could not act without the recommendation of the superintendent and
without his having prepared the budget. The court added that a court
of equity could correct the situation by acting in personam upon the
person of the superintendent or other recalcitrant official or by force
of direct decree.70
As to the power of the courts to require the county court to provide
for the teacher's salary and traveling expenses in the budget, it was

67. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1401 to -1420

(1956).

68. 341 S.W.2d 746 (Tenn. 1960).
69. 161 Tenn. 324, 30 S.W.2d 250 (1930).
70. GIBsoN, SuITs iN CHANCERY § 41 (5th ed. 1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
21-1203 to -1209 (1956).
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said that this was in the discretion of the county court, but that the
exercise of the discretion must be reasonable. 71
4. Division of Local School Funds.-The question in Board of Education v. Shelby County 2 concerned the validity of certain private
acts applicable to Shelby County. These acts provided for division
of local school funds and the proceeds of an issue of county school
bonds between the county and city school systems on a fixed percentage basis instead of on an average daily attendance basis as pro73
vided by general statute.
There would have been no difficulty in finding the private acts
invalid 4 had it not been for certain appended provisions in several
general education acts by which the legislature attempted to reserve
the right to act by private act.7 5 Illustrative of these provisions was
the one in the General Education Act of 194776 which directed
division of local school funds on an average daily attendance basis,
but added "unless otherwise provided by Private Act." The court
held that this provision and similar provisions in other general education acts were attempts to suspend the general law and in violation
of article 11, section 8, of the state constitution. The legislature could
not suspend the general law by private act, and it could not authorize
a suspension of the general law by an appended provision to a public
act. The private acts depending upon such provisions were therefore
invalid as suspending the general law for the benefit of one county
and individuals therein. There was found to be no reasonable basis
for such discrimination. The same problems and the same general
situation existed in Shelby County as in all other counties in respect
to its educational system.
5. Legislation.-Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-233 prohibits
the creation or reactivation of a city or special school district school
system unless it is large enough to offer adequate educational opportunities for pupils of grades one through twelve in keeping with
standards established by the state board of education.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-1105 raises substantially the
71. State ex rel.Brown v. Polk County, 165 Tenn. 196, 54 S.W.2d 714 (1932).
72. 339 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1960).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-206 (1956).
74. In Davidson County v. City of Nashville, 190 Tenn. 136, 228 S.W.2d
89 (1950), an act substantially the same as those involved in the principal
case was held invalid as an attempt to change the method of dividing school
funds from that provided by general law.
75. Whether there was a valid classification on a population basis to make
the acts general was dismissed with the statement that the private acts
involved "apply to only one county, that of Shelby, and were never intended
to apply to any other county." Davidson County v. City of Nashville, 190
Tenn. 136, 228 S.W.2d 89 (1950).

76. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, ch. 8, § 16.

1961]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

1347

number of pupils in average daily attendance required for the establishment of junior and senior high schools by county, city, or special
school district boards of education. This section, however, specifically
permits the consolidation of any two or more high schools now established even though the required number of pupils would not be
met.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 49-712 and 49-713 amend existing
law so as to change the method of distributing bond funds to special
school districts from a "scholastic population" basis to an "average
daily attendance" basis. They also regulate the use of the special
school fund by counties, cities and special school districts.
IV. LocAL GOVERMUENT IN GENERAL-LEGISLATION

The 1961 General Assembly passed several public acts relating to
or affecting local governments. In addition to the public acts already
mentioned the following seem significant.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 57-205 and 57-209 make the
action of any county or municipal beer board in connection with the
issuance of any order, including the revocation of a license or permit
or the refusal to grant a license or permit, reviewable by statutory
writ of certiorari; a trial de novo may be substituted for an appeal.
The same method of review is provided for refusal of any county
beer board to grant a hearing upon the person's application for a
license or permit.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 65-405 provides that any future
franchise payments or other payments made by a privately owned
public utility to a municipality or other local government, for the
use of public streets, alleys, or other public places, or any future
license, privilege, occupation or excise tax payment above those now
paid, shall be billed pro rata to the utility customers receiving local
service within the municipality or local government, and shall not
otherwise be considered by the public service commission in fixing
the rates and charges of the utility.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 35-326 authorizes the state,
municipal corporations and political subdivisions to invest any sinking
funds, pension funds, or other funds in any bonds or other obligation
issued by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 6-3704, 6-3706, 6-3707, and 63711 amend the metropolitan governmental law to permit the creation of a charter commission by private act, and repeal Tennessee
Code Annotated section 6-3705, which provided for the election of
members. The amendment also requires removal from the total area
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of the urban services district such areas of the principal city as to
which the metropolitan government will not be able to provide
substantial urban services within a reasonable period, in the event
such territory has been added to the principal city subsequent to the
creation of a charter commission or subsequent to the time of the
filing of the proposed charter.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 9-313 to -315 require each office,
department, agency, division, or board of a political subdivision to be
audited annually, and provides that a copy of the audit shall be sent
to the state comptroller.
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 54-557 and 54-558 provide that
municipalities or political subdivisions owning or operating utilities,
or a privately owned utility "for which the municipality or other
political subdivision is legally responsible under a valid contract or
franchise for relocation costs," may obtain reimbursement of ninety
per cent of the costs of relocating utilities on the interstate highway
system, or on urban extensions thereof, "hereafter constructed."
Tennessee Code Annotated sections 8-3453 to -3457 require that any
retirement system established by the state or any of its political
subdivisions must become actuarially sound on or before January 1,
1966, and be so declared by the state comptroller; otherwise, it must
suspend payment to all beneficiaries.

